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Abstract
Ethical thought experiments such as the trolley dilemma have been investigated extensively
in the past, showing that humans act in a utilitarian way, trying to cause as little overall
damage as possible.  These trolley dilemmas have gained renewed attention over the past
years; especially due to the necessity of implementing moral decisions in autonomous driving
vehicles  (ADVs).  We conducted  a  set  of  experiments  in  which  participants  experienced
modified trolley dilemmas as the driver in a virtual reality environment. Participants had to
make decisionsbetween two discrete options: driving on one of two lanes where different
obstacles came into view. Obstacles included a variety of human-like avatars of different ages
and group sizes. Furthermore, we tested the influence of a sidewalk as a potential safe harbor
and a condition implicating a self-sacrifice. Results showed that subjects, in general, decided
in  a  utilitarian  manner,  sparing  the  highest  number  of  avatars  possible  with  a  limited
influence of the other variables. Our findings support that people’s behavior is in line with the
utilitarian  approach  to  moral  decision  making.  This  may  serve  as  a  guideline  for  the
implementation of moral decisions in ADVs.
Introduction
Since their invention in the 19th century, cars have considerably influenced the townscapes
and  societies  all  over  the  world.  Due  to  the  continuous  development  and  increasing
sophistication of vehicles, this impact is still ongoing. It even seems that we are getting closer
reaching another milestone: a car thatis capable of driving without a human driver. In the last
years,  there  has  been  a  considerable  advance  in  the  development  of  such  autonomous
vehicles. Many features of automation, such a cruise control, and camera based blind spot
assistance and parallel parking have already become a standard in modern cars. The majority
of car manufacturers, as well as service providers like Uber, are currently working on ADV's
and planning to commercially market them by latest 2025 (Harst, 2016). However, with the
development  of  disruptive  technologies,  new  problems  arise.  As  the  introduction  of
autonomous vehicles might have a large impact on society, critical issues spread over a wide
range of areas including psychological, and ethical, socioeconomic as well as legal aspects.
These  far-reaching  implications  are  also  evident  in  the  fact  that  autonomous  cars  have
recently become a topic of interest in science. In particular, the implementation of moral
decisions  in  self-driving  cars  remains  widely  debated (e.g.Bonnefon,  Shariff,  & Rahwan,
2016; Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2014, 2015a, 2015b).
Moral decisions by autonomous systems are often discussed on the basis of trolley dilemmas.
The  classical  trolley  dilemma  was  first  introduced  in  1967  as  a  philosophical  thought
experiment (Foot, 1967). The key element is a trolley that is heading straight towards a group
of people, e.g. five, on the rails unable to escape. There is, however, a sidetrack on which a
single  person,  who  is  unaware  of  the  trolley,  stands.  The  participant  in  this  thought
experiment  is  standing next  to a lever that enables the trolley to switch to  the sidetrack.
Without intervention, the trolley will kill the five people on the main track. On pulling the
lever, the trolley will continue on the sidetrack killing only one person, resulting in a moral
dilemma  for  the  participant.  How do  people  decide  in  such  situations  and  which  moral
principles govern their decision process? This question has been investigated and debated
extensively since (e.g. Mikhail, 2007; Thomson, 1976, 1985; Unger, 1996). So far, research
on  modified  trolley  dilemmas  has  shown  that  people  in  general  act  utilitarian  and  are
relatively comfortable with utilitarian ADVs, programmed to minimize harm  (Bonnefon et
al., 2016; Skulmowski, Bunge, Kaspar, & Pipa, 2014). In contrast, German law interdicts the
evaluation  of  human life  (Art.  1  Abs.  1  GG) in  any way.  Thus,  the  trolley  dilemma as
applying to autonomous systems is still not resolved.
Moreover, studies including such trolley dilemmas were traditionally carried out in the form
of philosophical essays. This means that the material was presented to the participants in the
form of written scenario descriptions,  sometimes with additional  pictorial  representations.
This  way  of  presenting  the  dilemma  introduces  issues  like  the  disregard  of  important
contextual  and situational  influences  in  moral  decision-making(Skulmowski  et  al.,  2014).
New technologies such as virtual reality (VR) help to remedy these insufficiencies. In this
context,  trolley  dilemmas  have  recently  experienced  a  revival  in  science(e.g.  Navarrete,
McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012; Pan, Banakou, & Slater, 2011; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando,
Chittaro,  & Silani,  2014; Skulmowski et  al.,  2014). The immersion thatVR environments
provide serves to improve ecological validity while maintaining control over experimental
variables (Madary & Metzinger, 2016). In consequence, it seems that we should also benefit
from VR technologies to find out how people actually behave in dilemma situations during
car driving when they are immersed in a more realistic experimental environment as opposed
to their decisions in plain thought experiments.
Furthermore, many possible modifications of the trolley dilemma elicit open questions. For
example, different characteristics of the potential victims might influence the human decision
process. Previous studies have shown that children were saved more often than adults, so that
age of the potential victims might play a role in decision-making(Sütfeld, Gast, König, &
Pipa, 2016). In the context of autonomous cars, there are additionally certain traffic-specific
aspects worth considering. German law, for instance, inflicts punishment to prevent citizens
from driving on the sidewalk in order to provide a safe space for pedestrians in traffic (STVO
§49 Abs.2). This might lead to an internalized reluctance to drive on the sidewalk that might
also influence the decision process in a trolley dilemma modified accordingly. Furthermore,
there are possible scenarios in which people can only save lives by sacrificing their own.
Despite  evidence  from surveys  that  revealed  a  willingness  to  use  self-sacrificing  ADVs
(Bonnefon et al., 2016), it is questionable whether people would indeed act this way in a
realistic setting.
The  present  study  addresses  these  open  questions  and  improves  the  experimental  study
designby using VR. It thereby aims at establishing whether an ethical framework can describe
decision-making in moral dilemma situations during car driving. This framework could then
serve as a basis for algorithmsto be implemented in autonomous vehicles. Here we test five
hypotheses: First, based on previous research we postulate that people would in general act in
favor of the quantitative greater good, trying to keep the number of persons to be hit on a
minimum level (Hypothesis 1). Yet, we speculate that the age of the potential victims matters
in  the  sense  that  people  might  spare  younger  individuals  as  opposed  to  older  ones
(Hypothesis 2). In the traffic-specific context,  we expect that pedestrians on the sidewalk
would be protected, as they are not actively taking part in traffic. By staying on the sidewalk
people generally, expect to be safe while implicitly giving consent to the finite risk of being
injured  when stepping on the  street.  Therefore,  we hypothesize  that  people  would avoid
hitting pedestrians on the sidewalk in contrast to persons standing on the street (Hypothesis
3). On the other hand, we hypothesize that people prefer to protect children even if they are
standing on the  street  as  opposed  to  adults  on  the  sidewalk  (Hypothesis  4).  Finally,  we
hypothesize that people would not reject self-sacrifice completely, but consider it when a
high threshold of damage to others was reached (Hypothesis 5). To test these hypotheses, we
implemented a driving simulation experiment with state-of-the-art virtual reality technologies
following a study by Sütfeld et al. (2016). Participants were able to control a car as the driver
and experienced various modified trolley dilemma situations as specified in the following.
2. Results
We analyzed data from 189 participants in a total of 4000 trials, distributed according to the
hypotheses mentioned above into five modules. The results will be described in the following
for each module separately.
Figure 1: Decision distribution in the Quantitative Greater Good module. The graph depicts for every decision
type in this module, how many participants decided one or the other way. 
2.1 Quantitative Greater Good
In the first module, we tested whether people would act in favor of the quantitative greater
good, by saving more instead of fewer avatars. This module consisted of three trials. The
environment for this module was the suburban level setting, consisting of a two-lane road.
We presented  only  standing  adults  as  avatars.  In  the  suburban  level  setting  parked  cars
occupied  both  sides  of  the  two-lane  street.  In  the  one  versus  two  and  one  versus  six
conditions, only 7 out of 189 participants targeted the higher number of avatars (Figure 1). In
the one versus four conditions, 12 participants targeted the four avatars instead of one. Thus,
in all three conditions, the overwhelming majority of participants spared the larger number of
avatars.
To investigate this difference between the conditions, we performed a permutation test. It
yielded  no  significant  difference  (p>0.05).This  shows  that  participants  acted  similarly
throughout all three conditions. For each single condition the number of participants targeting
one avatar instead of a larger number is highly significant (p<0.01). These data indicate that
participants decided in favor of the quantitative greater good.
2.2 Age-Considering Greater Good
The second module tested the hypothesis that people would spare younger avatars in favor of
older ones. It was composed of six trials in the suburban level setting. We used a child, an
adult and an old man as avatars. Each trial presented one of the following six combinations of
avatars: One child versus one standing adult, one child versus one old person, one standing
adult versus one old person, one kneeling person versus one standing adult,  one kneeling
person versus one old person, and one kneeling person versus one child.
In the pairwise comparisons of children, adults and elderly we observed that the younger
avatar was spared at the expense of the older avatar (Figure 2).A permutation test children vs.
adults against elderly vs. adults yielded highly significant differences (p<0.001). This result
demonstrates the inverse relation of the expected remaining lifespan of an avatar and the
chance to get hit.Thisdecrease in value according to age was highly significant (p<0.01).
Figure 2: Decision distribution in module Age-Considering Greater Good. The graph depicts for every decision
type in this module, how many percent of participants decided one or the other way. The left side shows purely
age-considering decisions; the right side shows decisions about object height.
To investigate whether the difference emerged only through the variation in avatar height we
tested kneeling adults vs. standing children, and elderly. We observed a highly significant
difference in the children vs. kneeling adults comparison (Figure 2 fourth block, p<0.001). In
the direct  comparison of  kneeling  adult  vs.  standing adult,  the  latter  was hit  more often
(p<0.001).  A similar pattern emerged in the comparison kneeling adult  vs.  elderly.  Thus,
kneeling vs. standing moderates the participants’ decisions to some degree. Yet, these results
confirm that participants would spare younger avatars in favor of older ones irrespective of
the height of the avatar.
2.3 The Influence of Context
Figure 3: The Influence of Context module. The graph depicts for varying numbers of avatars the fraction of
decisions sacrificing the single avatar on the sidewalk or the group of avatars on the street.  The left lane is
showing a sidewalk with the possibility to drive on, the right lane a one-way street.
In the third module, we explored the influence of context. Specifically, we hypothesized that
avatars located on a sidewalk would be spared more often than on the street. Therefore, in
direct analogy to the first module, we matched a single adult avatar on the sidewalk with two
to six adult avatars on the street.
This module consisted of six trials in city levels using a two-lane street or a single lane plus
sidewalk. These city level settings contained a one-way street with a sidewalk on both sides.
One of the sidewalks was blocked by parked cars while participants had the opportunity to
drive on the other one in order to avoid avatars on the street.
We hypothesized that, compared to the first module, a larger difference in the number of
avatars  would  be  necessary  to  lead  to  a  consistent  sacrifice  of  the  single  avatar  on  the
sidewalk. Context did not seem to have a strong effect on decisions in general.  Still,  the
majority of participants consistently sparedthe highest number of avatars possible, regardless
of the sidewalk context (Figure 3). We investigated whether a switch point, defined by a
critical  imbalance  of  the  number  of  avatars,  could  adequately  describe  the  participants'
decisions. That is if the number of avatars to be hit on the street is larger than this threshold
participants change from driving on the street to driving on the sidewalk to save a large
enough group of obstacles.  Our data showed that  only 2.56% of trials  would need to be
changed, for all participants to behave consistently according to a simple model with a single
free parameter, the switch point.
For statistical evaluation, we fitted models, describing different switch points, to our data and
compared the sums of squared residuals of the models, to identifythe model that fits the data
best. Results showed that modeling the data with a switch point between the conditions with
one versus two and one versus three avatars describes the data best (Figure 4), with a sum of
squared residuals of 34.0. This, in turn, indicatesthat participants rather chose to drive on the
sidewalk in order to save a group of three or more obstacles in contrast to saving only two
obstacles.  However,  throughout  all  conditions,  the  number  of  participants  driving  on the
sidewalk in order to save more obstacles is significantly higher than those trying to save the
obstacle on the sidewalk.In comparison to the Quantitative Greater Good module, we only
find  minor  quantitative  differences.  This  shows  that  the  sidewalk  altogether  shows  a
surprisingly small effect.
Figure 4: Depiction of the best-fitted model for decisions in the Influence of Context module. The raw data is
depicted translucent, and the model is non-transparent. The model with the lowest sum of squared residuals had
a switch point between two and three obstacles on the street.
2.4 Interaction of Age and Context
Figure 5: Interaction of Age and Context module. The graph depicts for one or two avatars of adults on the
sidewalk and one or two avatars of children on the street the fraction of decisions sacrificing one or the other
group. As in figure 3 and 4, the left lane is showing a sidewalk with the possibility to drive on. The right lane is
a one-way street.
In  the  Age-Considering  Greater  Good  and  the  Influence  of  Context  modules,  we  had
investigated the influence of age and context respectively in isolation. In the fourth module,
we wanted to find out whether there is also an interaction of age and context. Hence, we also
used the city level setting with the sidewalk and additionally included children avatars. There
were three trials with the following combinations of avatars: two children on the street versus
one adult on the sidewalk, one child on the street versus two adults on the sidewalk, and one
child on the street versus one adult on the sidewalk.
Results showed that the majority of participants again spared children as opposed to adults
despite the sidewalk context (Figure 5), as could be expected based on the findings from the
previous modules.
In a further analysis, two permutation tests were performed to check for differences in the
target actions of participants regarding the number of avatars. The conditions with one child
on the street and one or two adults on the sidewalk were significantly different from one
another (p<0.001). The same holds for the comparison of the condition with one child and
one adult versus the condition of two children and one adult (p<0.05). The results were in
accordance  with  the  findings  from all  previous  modules.  Furthermore,  the  pattern  of  the
results is compatible with independent effects of sidewalk and age. 
2.5 Self-Sacrifice
In the fifth module, we investigated whether participants value their own life in the VR setup
similarly to  the value of the other avatars.  That  is,  we gave them the possibility  to save
avatars at the price of sacrificing their own avatar. In close analogy to the previous modules,
we investigated participants’ choice as a function of the number of avatars in one of two
groups. We hypothesizedthat the switch point, i.e. the number of avatars of the other group
necessary  to  induce  consistent  decisions,  would  increase  in  comparison  to  the  non-self-
sacrifice condition in the first module. 
The  Self-Sacrifice  module  contained  six  trials  in  the  mountain  level  2,  where  we
implemented a chasm on the right lane of the street with a construction sign in front of it. On
the left lane,we presented a varying numberof standing adults, ranging from two to seven
avatars. The design was created to imply that participants would commit self-sacrifice within
the experimental paradigm by driving off the cliff when driving in the right lane.
Figure 6: Self-Sacrifice module. The graph depicts the fraction of decisions for self-sacrifice or sacrifice a group
of avatars. In each condition onthe left lane is a normal street lane with a varying number of avatars. The right
lane leads to a chasm. Continuing this way leads to a self-sacrifice. The best-fitted model is depicted as a line.
The model with the lowest sum of squared residuals had a switch point between four and five obstacles on the
street.
Analyzing the data of this module, we followed the same procedure as in the Influence of
Context module. We postulated that a fixed threshold could describe the behavior of subjects.
In case the number of avatars on the street was below the threshold, the group would be
sacrificed. In contrast, when it wasabove the threshold subjects would choose self-sacrifice.
We found that on average the decisions of only 5.2% of trials were not consistent with such a
simple model. 
To see if there is a generalswitching point, where people most likely change behavior towards
self-sacrifice, we fitted a model via linear regression to the data. We fitted six models to the
data, computed and compared the sums of squared residuals. The model with a switch point
between the conditions with four and five obstacles best described our data (Figure 6). Then,
with a value of 3, the sum of squared errors of this model is much smaller than the ones of the
other models. This indicates that people are consistently willing to sacrifice themselves in
case of being able to save a group of 5 or more obstacles with this decision.
However,  it  should be noted that about  half  of the participants  were already consistently
willing to sacrifice themselves to save only one avatar. The results of this module, therefore
indicate that people are still acting in favor of the quantitative greater good even when their
own life is at stake.
3 Discussion
Driving a car in virtual reality participants act in favor of the quantitative greater good. That
is behavior consistently aimed at sparing as many avatars as possible at the expense of others.
This even applied to situations in which participants had to virtually sacrifice their own avatar
in  order  to  save  others.  Age  and  context  weakly  modulated  these  behavioral  patterns.
Specifically we observed an inverse relation of the probability to sacrifice an avatar and the
expected remaining lifespan of an avatar. Participants consistently saved younger avatars as
opposed  to  older  ones.  The  control  condition  using  kneeling  adults  instead  of  children
confirmed that this effect was not determined by the size of the visual appearance of the
avatar.  Surprisingly  the  context  in  the  form of  sidewalk  versus  street  had  only  a  small
influence.  Contrary  to  our  expectations,  the  sidewalk  did  notsubstantially  affect  decision
making, given that participants did not seem to be reluctant to drive on the sidewalk in order
to spare a higher number of avatars.In conclusion, our results over all conditions support the
hypothesis that people act in favor of the quantitative greater goodeven in scenarios involving
a sidewalk or self-sacrifice.
Next, we will discuss potential limitations of the study. We phrased the dilemma in terms of
sacrificing one or the other avatar. However, it is not self-evident that hitting one or more
avatars  would  automatically  lead  to  death.  Indeed,  some  participants  reported  after  the
experiment, that the car was too slow to kill a human being. Before killing himself in the self-
sacrifice trials, the participant had chosen to stop the car by driving into the group of avatars,
risking injuries but no lethal damage. This might contribute to the equal treatment of groups
larger than five people in the Self-Sacrifice module. On the other hand, phrasing the trolley
dilemma, not in terms of life and death, but in terms of health or injury is of equal relevance. 
The aspect that a collision might not necessarily lead to the death of the victim has to be
considered when comparing avatars of different age.  Potentially,  participants were hitting
adults more often instead of children not only because of age and expected lifespan, but also
because they are less likely to die in case of a crash. It is not obvious, whether this argument
is compatible with the preference to save children even when matched with kneeling adults.
Due to the increased risk of fatal injury when hit by a car in a kneeling position, these avatars
should  have  been  treated  similarly  to  children.  Still,  it  is  possible  that  participants  were
pondering more complex decision processes including severity of injury and risk of death. In
social sciences, the term Disability-Adjusted Life Year(DALY) has been introduced (Murray,
1994). It is a complex measure and can be roughly understood as the number of years of a
healthy life lost. Such a description would naturally explain the inverse relation between age
and the probability of being spared. Thus, the decision process might be better described not
by simply counting the number of lives, but as a more complex measure such as the DALY.
Moreover, general limitations of graphical display could have affected participants’ decision
processes and immersion. This appeals the fact that some participants dropped out of the
experiment  because  they  did  not  feel  comfortable  with  virtually  hitting  avatars.  This
observation does not support a lack of realism or immersion.  However, there seem to be
many individual differences in play. In this regard, it cannot be ruled out for sure either that
some, especially young, participants were not as committed to the study as expected but were
mainly  interested  in  the  new VR technology  offering  a  game-like  experience.  Thus,  the
average degree of immersion was rated high, but individual variations should be taken into
consideration in further research addressing these problems. 
In the field of implementing autonomous driving behavior, empiric knowledge is relatively
sparse  and  ethical  approaches  are  widely  debated.  Usable  ADVs,  as  well  as  advanced
simulation techniques  like 3D virtual  reality,  are  relatively  new. Consequently,  empirical
studies rely heavily on questionnaires directing issues straight at the potential customers. The
behavior of ADVs and their control algorithms will be judged by the standards and ethics of
the society in which they operate. This again emphasizes the crucial role of acceptance. It
seems reasonable since self-driving  cars  need moral  algorithms capable  of  three aspects:
being  consistent,  not  causing  public  outrage  and  not  discouraging  potential  buyers
(Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2015). Since it is arguable whether artificial agents can truly
exhibit moral behavior, the programming behind these cars will be judged. Therefore, the
problem is reflected back to humans. ADVs not only have to embody the laws, but also the
ethical principles of the society they operate in (Gerdes & Thornton, 2015).
Various studies were conducted, given the assumption that passengers would like ADVs to
behave similarly to humans  (Goodall, 2014; Malle, Scheutz, Arnold, Voiklis, & Cusimano,
2015; Sikkenk & Terken, 2015). They found that many factors drastically influence human
behavior in traffic, e.g. weather conditions and the driving style of other traffic participants.
This raises concerns about a  uniform behavior in ADVs(Sikkenk & Terken,  2015).  Such
differences  do  not  only  occur  in  driving  but  also  in  judging  decisions  of  humans  and
machines.  Another  study examined the differences  in  responsibility  between humans and
machines in cases of an inevitable fatal crash. Participants had to judge the decision of either
a human driver in a dilemma situation, or an autonomous car deciding on its own. In contrast
to  human  drivers,  where  utilitarian  decisions  were  most  favorable,  participants  expected
ADVs to behave in a utilitarian manner under all circumstances (Li, Zhao, Cho, Ju, & Malle,
2016; Malle et al., 2015).
These  studies  point  out,  that  the  general  population  seems  to  favor  utilitarian
decisions(Bonnefon et al.,  2015; Li et al.,  2016; Malle et al.,  2015). This applies even to
cases, where the driver has to sacrifice himself for the greater good(Sachdeva, Iliev, Ekhtiari,
& Dehghani, 2015). Such behavior is in line with the general philosophers’ opinion(Fischer
& Ravizza, 1992) and can be understood as an act of maximizing utility  (Thomson, 1985).
Therefore,  it  is  mostly  referred  to  as  utilitarian  reasoning  and  decision-making.  On first
thought, utilitarian decisions offer themselves to a quantitative treatment and appear to be
suitable for ADVs. However, the problem of how to implement ethics in machines, especially
in dilemma situations remains. A recent project at the Bristol robot laboratories  (Winfield,
Blum, & Liu, 2014) showed, that there is no such thing as a simple rule, like the first Asimov
robot law, to save human life when it comes to dilemma situations. To fix that, more rules
have to be applied to the code. On matters of judgments like these, not even humans always
agree  (Deng,  2015).  These  seem  to  be  crucial  aspects  to  promote  ADVs  to  potential
customers and allow them to be an integral part of our society.
In  general,  it  is  questionable  whether  machines  should  mimic  human  behavior  just  to
encourage potential customers given that this might entail a naturalistic fallacy. To avoid this
case,  other  articles  argue  against  the moral  Turing  test  as  framework for  moral  machine
performance,  since it  is  vulnerable to  deception,  inadequate reasoning and inferior  moral
performance.  The  moral  Turing  test,  in  form  of  obligations  and  norms,  does  not  settle
morality  of  an  action  fully.  Furthermore,when  it  comes  to  a  fatal  crash  the  utilitarian
approach  is  forbidden  by  law.  To  protect  the  human  dignity  of  each  individual,  a
classification of value, meaning discrimination, is not allowed according to §1 Abs 1, GG and
the 14th amendment of the US constitution(Lin, 2015). A transparent, accountable process of
reasoning,  reliably  prefiguring  moral  performance  in  line  with  current  law  is  suggested
instead.Autonomous  systems should  be predictable,  controlled  and transparent  -  allowing
explicit reworking and recasting (Arnold & Scheutz, 2016). In conclusion, rather than hard-
and-fast rules now, review boards are suggested which would provide a process to allow
manufacturers,  lawyers,  ethicists,  and  government  entities  to  work  through  these  ethical
decisions (Kirkpatrick, 2015).
Another option to potentially deal with moral issues would be to give control back to the
driver  during  periods  of  congestion  or  treacherous  conditions  just  like  the  German
government suggests(Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2014). In this case the machine is not fully
autonomous and an accountable driver would still  be required so that the ADV wouldn’t
show  full  potential(Kirkpatrick,  2015).  However,  as  such  crucial  situations  are  usually
associated  with  severe  time  constraints,  giving  control  back  to  the  driver  might  quickly
amount  to  no  decision.  That  this  course  of  action,  however,  is  optimal  or  desirable  is
questionable.
As a further alternative, a  form of a hybrid between the moral Turing test and a straight
logical  approach  has  been  suggested.  Because  ethical  dilemmas  do  not  necessarily  have
objective answers, but significant ethical implications for the user, key elements for solving
the  question  how  ADVs  should  behave  are  therefore  ethicists  as  experts  for  ethical
evaluations of robotics(Millar, 2016). 
Despite manyunsolved issues, fully autonomous self-driving cars would improve mobility for
elderly  or  disabled  people, reduce  crashes,  decimate  annual  fatalities  in  traffic,  ease
congestion,  improve fuel economy, reduce parking, and offer mobility to those unable to
drive. The U.S. economic benefits could reach around 25 billion dollar per year with only
10% market penetration. Including high penetration rates, this raises the annual benefit up to
$430 billion,  which  makes  ADV a  technology of  a  better  future(Fagnant  & Kockelman,
2015). The number of avoided fatalities is a sufficient reason to promote ADVs. Therefore,
the idea of McBride(2016)for partial  automation only is  decidedly rejected here. Instead,
further research addressing open questions should be encouraged. These range from technical
issues, to ethical and psychological problems, as well as legal aspects like responsibility and
policy issues.
Summarizing,  our  results  show that  participants  behave consistently  utilitarian in  various
dilemma situations.  These  decisions  were  only  slightly  modulated  by  context,  such  as  a
sidewalk. Further, the effect of age might be subsumed in a utilitarian decision process as
well.  Even in conditions  involving a  self-sacrifice participants decisions  were compatible
with  a  utilitarian  strategy.  Such  strong  behavioral  tendencies  must  be  considered  in  the
implementation of moral decisions in ADVs especially when aiming at a high acceptance in
society.
In  the  discussion  of  a  broadly  applicable  ethical  framework,  our  research  explores  the
foundation for such a framework. The study provides a basis for an algorithm implementing
morals in ADVs by describing how human car drivers would behave in these conditions and
therefore what is seen fit as behavior in general traffic situations.
4 Material and Methods
4.1 Participants
216 unpaid subjects participated in the study. Participants were acquired from various venues.
142 were tested in  the laboratory or cafeteria and at  the alumni conference of Cognitive
Science of the University of Osnabrück. 74 participants were tested at public locations, such
as the waiting rooms of the City Hall of Osnabrück and at a local inspection authority, the so-
called KFZ-Prüfstelle. Data from 27 participants had to be excluded from the analysis for
various  reasons:  15  participants  did  not  complete  the  experiment  due  to  nausea  or
disagreement with the experimental settings. Moreover, 12 participants were excluded from
analysis as they had failed more than six times in the training trials. In the end data from 189
participants served for analysis (62 female, 127 male). They were aged between 18 and 67
years with a mean of 24.32 years.
4.2 Apparatus and Setup
For the technical apparatus at every venue,we used a computer equipped with an Intel Xeon 
E5620 with 2.4 GHz, 12 GB RAM, and the 64-bit operating system Windows 7 Professional. 
The NVIDIA GeForce GTX 970 and NVIDIA Quadro NVS 295 (GPU) served for graphics. 
We used the Oculus Rift DK2 in combination with Bose Noise Cancelling Headphones as 
VR equipment.
4.3 Stimuli and Design
The experiment was designed as a computer application with featured movement in a virtual reality.Figure 7:
Screenshots of the experiment virtual reality environment. The participants could decide between driving on one
of  two lanes  and  thus  decide  which  of  two avatars  to  hit  or  hit  an  avatar  vs.  driving  into  a  chasm.  The
screenshots  are  taken  out  of  the  modules:  A:  Age-considering  Greater  Good  in  the  suburban  setting.  B:
Quantitative Greater Good module in the mountain setting. C: Self-Sacrifice module showing the road sign
warning of the oncoming chasm in the mountain setting. D: Self-Sacrifice module in the mountain setting. E:
Age-considering Greater Good module in the city setting with cars on the left side. F: Age-Considering Greater
Good module in the city setting with cars on the right side.
One training track setting and five different experiment track settings were presented. In each
setting, participants were driving a car on a two-path track. The car was driving at a constant
speed of 36 km/h, which was displayed on a screen in VR, and the tracks ranged between
180m and 200m to avoid habituation to the trial length. The surroundings varied between five
different environmental settings - a suburban, two mountain and two city level settings. The
starting lane (left/right lane) was randomized for each trial, only in the city level participants
always started on the drivable lane to avoid the sidewalk as starting position.
In order to decrease the visual range and thereby guarantee a constant decision-time of four
seconds, all settings included foggy weather. A beeping sound indicated to the participants
that they had control over the vehicle. The relatively low speed of the car was selected as a
compromise  to  allow a  reasonable  time  for  deliberation  and  yet  have  the  nature  of  the
obstacle  clearly  visible.  At  15  meters  distance  from  the  avatars  another  beeping  sound
signaled that the control over the vehicle was withdrawn as later inputs would have led to
incomplete lane change maneuvers.
The presented avatars were only male to avoid an effect of gender difference. As previous
studies showed that male and female avatars are treated differently, we decided to use only
males in order to avoid an effect of gender difference  (Sütfeld et al., 2016). These distinct
types of avatars appeared on the lanes in different combinations as specified in the following:
The  Quantitative Greater Good module consisted of three trials to test Hypothesis 1. The
environment for this module was the suburban and the mountain level setting, both consisting
of a two-lane road. We presented only standing adults presented as avatars. In the suburban
level setting parked cars occupied both sides of the two-lane street. The setting included a
suburban style environment with houses and front lawns. There was always one avatar on one
laneas opposed to either two, four or six avatars on the other lane. The respective sides were
randomized. The mountain level setting consisted of a mountainside as limitation on the left
and a crash barrier in front of a steep ravine on the right side of the two-lane street. 
The Age-Considering Greater Good module aimed at testing Hypothesis 2. It was composed
of six trials in the suburban level setting. We used a child, an adult and an old man as avatars;
additionally a kneeling adult served to make sure that possible effects were not only due to
the size of the stimuli, given that the kneeling adult was of the same height as the child. Each
trial  presented  one  of  the  following  six  combinations  of  avatars:  One  child  versus  one
standing adult, one child versus one old person, one standing adult versus one old person, one
kneeling person versus one standing adult, one kneeling person versus one old person, and
one kneeling person versus one child.
The  Influence of Context module  consisted of six trials in the city levels using a two-lane
street or, in the investigation of hypothesis 3, a single line plus sidewalk. These latter city
level settings contained a one-way street with a sidewalk on both sides. Parked cars blocked
one of the sidewalks, while participants had the opportunity to drive on the other one in order
to avoid avatars on the street. In city level setting 1, the sidewalk to drive on was on the left
side whilst in city level setting 2 the sidewalk to drive on was on the right side of the lane.
We randomized the number of trials within city level setting 1 or city level setting 2 between
subjects. There was always one standing adult on the sidewalk and a number of standing
adults on the street, varying between two and seven.
The Interaction of Age and Context module testing Hypothesis 4 was based on the Influence
of Context module  also using the city level settings, including children as avatars. The trial
settings were also intersubjectively randomized. There were three trials with the following
combination of avatars: two children on the street versus one standing adult on the sidewalk,
one child on the street versus two standing adults on the sidewalk, and one child on the street
versus one standing adult on the sidewalk.
The Self-Sacrifice module investigated Hypothesis 5 contained six trials in the mountain level
2. Here, we implemented a chasm on the right lane of the street with a construction sign in
front of it.  A varying number of standing adults, ranging from two to seven avatars, was
presented on the left lane. On the right side, a cliff and barricade with the corresponding
street sign appeared. These avatars were created to imply that participants would commit self-
sacrifice within the experimental paradigm by driving over the cliff when driving on the right
lane.
4.4 Procedure
Upon arrival, we informed participants about the content and the procedure of the experiment
and  asked  them to  sign  a  consent  form  clarifying  that  they  were  able  to  terminate  the
experiment at any time without stating any reason. We informed them that their data would
be  saved  anonymously.  Additionally,  they  were  asked  whether  they  had  experienced  a
traumatic  car  accident  previously.  If  this  question  had  been  positively  answered,  the
participant would have been excluded from the experiment.  Once the consent was given,
participants were seated at a desk and provided with predefined oral instructions. They were
told that the VR experiment consisted of three phases: training trials, experimental trials and
a questionnaire. During the trials, they would be  alone in the car as the driver and would
drive  always  on  one  of  two  lanes  in  different  environmental  levels.  Participants  were
furthermore instructed to use the left or right arrow keys to change the driving lane in the
trials and to additionally press the spacebar to confirm their answers in the instruction and
questionnaire sections. They were also informed that the monitor for overviewing during the
instructions would be turned off while performing the experimental trials and answering the
questionnaire.  Respective  written  instructions  were  additionally  presented  within  the
experiment. Finally, we adjusted the Oculus Rift as well as the headphones to their head and
the  experiment  started.  Three  initial  training  trials  served  to  get  accustomed  to  the  VR
environment and to obtain control over the car.  To pass the training phase, in each training
trial participants had to avoid three pylons appearing on one of the lanes alternately with the
first one always on the starting lane. If they hit a pylon, the trial had to be repeated. After
successfully completing all three training trials, the various types of avatars to hit or to spare
in the experimental trials were presented one by one and then the trials started. In the end,
participants answered the questionnaire to finish the experiment. The questionnaire data is,
however,  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  paper  and  will  be  presented  elsewhere.  The
duration of the whole experiment was approximately 15-20 minutes.
4.5 Statistical tests
For all analyses, we used Python 2.7. Only choices for the left or right lane and the avataron
the  lane  finally  selected  were taken into  account.  After  descriptively  analyzing the  data,
statistical tests were performed, to check our hypotheses and investigate the significance of
the results.
To  test,  if  participants  choose  a  smaller  number  of  avatars  to  spare  a  larger  number  in
inevitable crash scenario, we performed a permutation test on the complete data set of the
conditions of Quantitative Greater Good module, investigating the influences of the number
of  avatars  on  participants’  decisions.  This  accounts  also  for  the  Self-Sacrifice,  Age-
Considering Greater Good and Influence of Context module for each condition individually.
Additionally, the significance of a binomial test using pooled data proved significance in
comparison to our null-hypothesis of a random distribution of choices in the aforementioned
trials.
For the Age-Considering Greater Good module, as well as for the Self-Sacrifice module, we
calculated fractions of trials that would need to be changed in order for each participant to act
consistently in their decisions. This error rate would naturally be around 5% (Kuss, Jäkel, &
Wichmann, 2005). In order to test whether our data fits the hypothesis of a switch point, we
fitted different models on the data and computed the performance of each. Sixmodels were
fitted, each based on another underlying switch point. As we assumed that upon a certain
switch  point  participants  would  not  switch  back,  we  calculated  the  mean  between  the
conditions with an avatar number higher than a certain switch point and assumed that the
model would pass through this mean in a plateau. For the conditions with avatar numbers
smaller than the underlying switch point, we assumed a linear increase up to the calculated
mean. To test which model fits the data best, we computed and compared the sums of squared
residuals. After that, a permutation test was applied to check for inconsistencies in decisions
with more avatars than our assumed switching point for both modules.
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